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Irrational Prejudice: The Military's
Exclusion of Gay, Lesbian, and




On the brink of the new millennium, the European Court of
Human Rights declared that Britain must allow gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals to serve openly in its military! Indeed, the reach of this
landmark decision goes well beyond British borders. The European
Court of Human Rights is a court of last resort, much like the United
States Supreme Court, with jurisdiction over forty countries
representing about 800 million people.2 In the wake of this decision,
however, the United States has remained steadfast in implementing
its military ban on gays? Former Defense Secretary William Cohen
* B.A, 1997, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 2001, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law (expected). The author would like to thank
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat for his insights, the staff of Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly for their enthusiasm, her partner for her support, and finally all the people and
organizations who came to her assistance when she became yet another casualty of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy.
1. See Andrew Reding, The Human-Rights Verdict is in: Europe Wins, The U.S.
Supreme Court Has Been Overtaken as the World's Premier Arbiter of Justice, GLOBE &
MAIL, Jan. 27, 2000, at A19.
2. See id.
3. For convenience, the author frequently uses the term "gay" to refer collectively to
[461]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
defended the United States's military ban on gays as "balanced and
appropriate."'
On the campaign trail for the 1992 presidential election, then
Arkansas governor Bill Clinton targeted gay voters by promising to
lift the military ban on gays.' As a result, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C.
§ 654, part of the National Defense Authorization Act, or the so-
called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy ("Policy").6 Although the
Policy was touted as an enlightened compromise, gays are still barred
from serving in the armed services openly, honestly, and with dignity.
Worse yet; unlike segregation of African-American troops, which was
promulgated through military regulations and superseded by
President Truman's executive orders,7 the military ban on gays is
codified as law.' Unless Congress reverses course or the courts
declare the ban unconstitutional, the President has no power to
overturn it through an executive order.9
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the Policy,
and no federal court of appeals has found it unconstitutional." In
particular, equal protection challenges to the Policy have failed as a
result of the courts of appeals' use of rational basis review and the
doctrine of military deference. When the Court, in Romer v. Evans,"
struck down on equal protection grounds a Colorado constitutional
amendment that prohibited laws designed to protect gays, many
thought the demise of the Policy near. Yet the lower courts have
either completely ignored Romer v. Evans or have confined it to its
facts.1
3
Romer, however, should not be ignored in the military context.
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals.
4. Charles Aldinger, U.S., Britain Defend Differences on Gay Troops, REUTERS
ENG. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27,2000.
5. See Kathy Lewis, Clinton Fills State, CIA, Defense Jobs - Christopher, Albright
and Aspin Appointed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 23, 1992, at 1A.
6. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
7. See Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 499,520 (1991).
8. See 10 U.S.C. § 654.
9. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 602, 631-32
(1952).
10. In fact, the four courts of appeals to have reviewed the Policy have found it
constitutional. See discussion infra Part I.D.
11. 517 U.S. 620,623 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Decisions Expand Equal Protection Rights, NAT'L
L.J., July 29,1996, at C7.
13. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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Romer teaches that laws motivated by irrational fears and animus
toward gays are offensive to the Constitution.14 This Note adopts
Romer's central tenet, and seeks to provide a legal framework for an
equal protection challenge to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy.
This Note is divided into three parts. The first part explains
courts' reactions to the Policy. It describes the statutory and
regulatory scheme of the Policy and its enforcement history, as well as
the levels of scrutiny applied in equal protection challenges, and the
significance of Romer v. Evans.
The second part of this Note addresses the courts' reluctance to
apply Romer to the Policy. This section identifies three reasons for
the hesitation. First, some courts observe that Romer should not
apply in the military context because of the doctrine of military
deference. This Note addresses the ambiguity of the military
deference doctrine and argues for a standard that adequately
accounts for both military and individual interests. Using this
standard, the Policy does not deserve deference and should be
scrutinized under traditional equal protection analysis. Second,
courts are hesitant to apply Romer to the Policy because they are
unclear when to apply the heightened rationality standard
exemplified in Romer. Although heightened rationality does not
have the official imprimatur of the Court, this Note suggests that the
Court has used this fourth level of scrutiny when one or more of the
following factors are present: a suspect-like classification, a
fundamental-like right, or a law based solely on animus. This Note
argues that these factors were present in Romer and are present in the
Policy; therefore the heightened rationality standard is appropriate.
Third, courts are reluctant to use Romer because they seem to be
unclear about its holding in relation to Bowers v. Hardwick." This
Note contends that Hardwick does not affect the application of
Romer to the Policy.
The third part of this Note applies Romer to the Policy, arguing
that the Policy violates the Equal Protection Clause when evaluated
under heightened rationality review. It contends that unit cohesion is
not the true motivation behind the Policy and is not a legitimate
government interest. The Policy is both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive, and, most importantly, the Policy is motivated by animus
towards gays.
14. See 517 U.S. at 634-35.
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Winter 20011 IRRATIONAL PREJUDICE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
L The Policy and the Courts' Reactions
A. The Policy
The Policy is embodied in 10 U.S.C. § 654, as well as in various
Department of Defense directives. 6 Section 654 provides three ways
in which the military may discharge its service members for
homosexual conduct. 7 First, under the "act provision," if a service
member engages in, attempts to engage in, or solicits another to
engage in a homosexual act, then she will be discharged." Second,
under the "statement provision" a service member will be discharged
from the armed forces if the member states that she is a homosexual
or bisexual. 9 Third, under the "marriage provision" if a service
member marries or attempts to marry a person of the same sex, then
she will be discharged from service.' Homosexual conduct thus
includes homosexual acts' a statement by a member that
demonstrates a propensity' or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or
a homosexual marriage or attempted marriage?' Because
information about a service member's homosexual orientation can
come from any source,2 4 the Policy's popular moniker "Don't Ask,
16. 10 U.S.C. § 654; Department of Defense Directive 1304.26 (Qualification
Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction) [hereinafter DODD 1304.26];
DODD1332.14 (Enlisted Administrative Separations) [hereinafter DODD 1332.14];
DODD 1332.30 (Separation of Regular Commissioned Officers) [hereinafter DODD
1332.30].
17. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1).
19. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
20. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(3).
21. The Policy defines "homosexual acts" as "(A) any bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of
satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in
subparagraph (A)." 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3).
22. Although section 654 does not define "propensity," military regulations state that
propensity to engage in homosexual acts means more than an abstract preference or desire
to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will
engage in homosexual acts. See DODD 1332.14; 1332.30. In determining whether a
service member has rebutted the presumption, some or all of the following may be
considered: "(a) Whether the member has engaged in homosexual acts; (b) The member's
credibility; (c) Testimony from others about the member's past conduct, character, and
credibility; (d) The nature and circumstances of the member's statement; (e) Any other
evidence relevant to whether the member is likely to engage in homosexual acts." Id.
23. See also DODD 1332.14(H)(1)(a).
24. See 10 U.S.C. § 654.
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Don't Tell" is in fact misleading; a service membercan be discharged
for being gay regardless of whether she "tells."
The Policy, however, allows the military to retain some service
members who have committed homosexual conduct. A service
member who has violated the act provision may be retained if she
proves that her action is a departure from her customary behavior,
will not likely recur, was not accomplished through force, and if she
demonstrates that she does not have a propensity or intent to engage
in homosexual acts.' In addition, a service member who has violated
the statement provision by declaring her sexual orientation may rebut
the presumption that she has committed or intends to commit
homosexual acts.26 To successfully rebut this presumption, she must
demonstrate that she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts.'
The military purports to discharge service members based solely
on homosexual conduct, not status? The military claims to discharge
a service member under the statement provision "not because it
reflects the member's sexual orientation, but because the statement
indicates a likelihood that the member engages in or will engage in
homosexual acts." 9  At bottom, the Policy purports to regulate
homosexual acts, through the acts themselves and through the
presumption that a member who makes a statement of homosexual
orientation or marries someone of the same sex will commit
homosexual acts.
The Policy differs in minor ways from the former regulations.'
25. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1).
26. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
27. See id.
28. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
29. DODD 1332.14.
30. The Policy includes an extensive list of factual findings:
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits
exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and
maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces.
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces.
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of the Constitution
of the United States, it lies within the discretion of the Congress to establish
qualifications for and conditions of service in the armed forces.
(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in
combat should the need arise.
(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of the armed forces to
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The Policy does not contain a statement regarding homosexual status
as incompatible with military service. The Policy stipulates that
sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and is
not a bar to continued service.32 As a result, the military purports no
make extraordinary sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in order to provide
for the common defense.
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is,
the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat
effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness
of the individual unit members.
(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that -
(A) the extraordinary responsibilities of armed forces, the unique conditions
of military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion, require that the
military community, while subject to civilian control, exist as a specialized
society; and
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and
traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would
not be acceptable in civilian society.
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate a
member's life for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the member enters
military status and not ending until that person is discharged or otherwise
separated from the armed forces.
(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
apply to a member of the armed forces at all times that the member has a
military status, whether the member is on base or off base, and whether the
member is on duty or off duty.
(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is necessary because
members of the armed forces must be ready at all times for worldwide
deployment to a combat environment.
(12) The worldwide deployment of United States military forces, the
international responsibilities of the United States, and the potential for
involvement of the armed forces in actual combat routinely make it necessary for
members of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living conditions and
working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced
intimacy with little or no privacy.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of
military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of
military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons
whose presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the
armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit
cohesion that are the essence of military capability.
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity
or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the
high standards of morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability.
10 U.S.C. § 654(a).
31. See Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 (1981) (old policy).
32 See DODD 1332.14 (new policy).
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longer to ask new service members questions about their sexual
orientation, unless it is presented with credible "independent
evidence" indicating that a service member is lesbian, gay, or
bisexual."
B. Equal Protection Levels of Scrutiny
After the Civil War, widespread discrimination against former
slaves led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "No state shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3
This commitment went unrealized until 1954, when the Supreme
Court announced its seminal decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, ushering in the modem era of equal protection
jurisprudence. That same year, the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause applies not only to state and local
governments but also to the federal government through the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.37 Today, courts rely on the
Equal Protection Clause as part of their arsenal to combat invidious
discrimination and protect fundamental rights.
A basic issue in all equal protection cases is whether the
government's action is justified by a sufficient purpose. Most laws
distinguish people in one way or another. Presumably, underlying
each distinction is a purpose or objective. If a law is challenged on
equal protection grounds, the court determines whether the purpose
of the law is sufficient. In doing so, the court performs a sort of
constitutional balancing that varies depending on the type of
discrimination.
33. See DODD 1332.26. Despite the military's commitment not to "ask," discharges
are higher after the implementation of the Policy than before it. Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network reports the following: "The Pentagon discharged 1,034 service members
for being gay [in 1999], a slight drop from 1,149 the previous year [in 1998], but still
approximately three people per day. The current gay discharge rate is up 73% since the
policy was first implemented." Stacey Sobel & Kathi Westcott, Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network, Conduct Unbecoming: The Sixth Annual Report on "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass," (visited Mar. 18, 2001)
<http:lwww.sldn.orgltemplatesllaw/record.html?record=21>.
34. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448 (1939) (describing the history of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); see also Adarand Constructor v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (holding that equal protection applies in the same way to
state and federal governments).
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Generally, courts choose among three levels of review in
examining equal protection claims." The most rigorous level is strict
scrutiny." Under strict scrutiny a law is upheld only if the
government can prove that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling purpose.' This standard applies to a law that affects
either a suspect class or a fundamental right. Race or national origin
typifies a suspect class. 41 Fundamental rights include the right to
vote,42 the right to travel,143 and the right to privacy.4
The next level of review is intermediate scrutiny.' Under
intermediate scrutiny a law is upheld if the government can prove
that the law is substantially related to an important purpose.46 This
standard applies to quasi-suspect classes such as women' and non-
marital children.' Factors such as a group's immutable
characteristics, 49 exclusion from the political process," and presence of
a history of discrimination help determine whether a classification
deserves heightened scrutiny, either intermediate or strict."
The least probing level of scrutiny is rational basis review.
2
Under the rational basis test a law is upheld if it is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose.53 This standard usually applies to
economic or social welfare legislation not involving a suspect or
quasi-suspect class.' Unlike the heightened standards, the challenger
in a rational basis case bears the burden of proof;55 the challenger
38. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
39. See, e.g., id. at 440.
40. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37.
41. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430 (1984).
42. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,667 (1966).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757 (1966).
44. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
45. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
46. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448,496 (1980); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351,356 (1974).
50. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971).
51. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
54. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
55. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
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must show either that the purpose is illegitimate, or that the
relationship between the classification and the law is irrational.57
Courts afford great deference to the government under this
standard." The purpose need only be conceivable under any set of
facts to be considered legitimate. 9 The relationship between the
classification and the purpose need only be reasonable.' As a result,
courts tolerate laws that are over-inclusive,6' under-inclusive, 2 or
both.' Courts generally employ this minimal standard of scrutiny
when analyzing discrimination based on sexual orientation.'
C. Romer v. Evans and Heightened Rationality
A line of cases employing a more rigorous rational basis review
standard has emerged, though the Supreme Court has not explicitly
acknowledged the existence of this new standard. Romer v. Evans
and its predecessors65 exemplify this review, often-called heightened
rationality or rational basis with "bite."66 Heightened rationality, as
its name suggests, is more searching than the traditional rational basis
review. Although courts employ the same test as in traditional
rational basis review, they look more closely at the government's
purpose and require a tighter link between the purpose and the
legislation. 7 Over-inclusive or under-inclusive laws, therefore, are
less tolerated under heightened rationality than under traditional
56. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
57. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
58. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,230 (1981).
59. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
60. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,191 (1964).
61. Over-inclusive laws regulate individuals who are not similarly situated. See, e.g.,
New York Transit Auth. v. Beazar, 440 U.S. 568,592-93 (1979).
62. Under-inclusive laws do not regulate individuals who are similarly situated. See,
e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,110 (1949).
63. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,108 (1979).
64. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420,1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
65. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985);
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
66. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword- In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1,12 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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rational basis review.6'
In Romer v. Evans,6 the United States Supreme Court changed
the legal landscape of gay rights when it invalidated a Colorado
constitutional amendment prohibiting all laws that protected gays
from discrimination." Colorado defended this amendment,
"Amendment 2," by arguing that it placed gays on the same footing
as other persons.7 Amendment 2, the argument continued, denied
gays only those "special" rights that were not offered to others.'
Colorado also argued that Amendment 2 reinforced "respect for
other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties
of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections
to homosexuality."'73 Had the Court applied traditional rational basis
review, Amendment 2 would likely have passed constitutional muster.
The Court scrutinized Amendment 2 closely, however, and ruled
that it imposed "a broad and undifferentiated disability" on gays. 4 It
held that the sheer breadth of Amendment 2 was "so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward [gays]."75 In other words, the Court
explained, Amendment 2 "lack[ed] a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests." 76
The Court seemed to be saying one thing, but doing another. Its
close scrutiny of Amendment 2 suggests that the Court was applying a
more searching review than rational basis. At the same time,
however, the Court claimed only to be using rational basis review.
This Note argues that the Court actually applied heightened
rationality review, consistent with its past precedents.
7
Academics are split on the meaning of Romer and its
predecessors. Critics note that the Supreme Court has applied
68. See id.
69. See id. at 620.
70. See Sullivan, supra note 12.
71. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 635.
74. Id. at 632.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Other commentators argue that Romer v. Evans is not a traditional rational basis
review case. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme
Court From the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 INDIANA L. R. 357, 407-411
(1999).
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heightened rationality inconsistently,'8 and thus this line of cases is a
poor indicator of future Supreme Court actions." Some
commentators, however, have found patterns in its application.' One
commentator suggests that the Court is more likely to apply this
modified review to discrimination against "discrete and insular
minorities. ,8 ' He observes that if the victimized class is "attenuated
from the political process" and has shared, "permanent"
characteristics, and the classification is irrelevant to the government
purpose, then heightened rationality is appropriate.'
D. The Courts' Reactions to the Policy
Four federal courts of appeals have examined the Policy, but
none have found it unconstitutional.' This Note will concentrate
solely on challenges to the Policy under the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause ("Equal Protection
Clause").4 In this realm, challengers have focused mainly on the
statement and act provisions.'
Opponents contend that the Policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause even under rational basis review. They argue that the Policy's
rationales mask irrational prejudice against gay, lesbian, and bisexual
service members.' This irrational prejudice, they contend, is an
78. See id. at 415.
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See, e.g., Seth Harris, Note, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection,
Military Deference, and the Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men From the Military, 17
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 171 (1990).
81. It at 192.
82. Id.
83. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Able v. United States, 88
F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th
Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp.
260 (D. Md. 1995), affd mem., 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996); Thorne v. United States Dep't
of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Vir. 1996), affd mem., 139 F.3d 893 (4th Cir. 1998).
These cases do not include challenges under the old ban, which was promulgated under
military regulations.
84. Some challenge the Policy under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause,
but those challenges are outside the scope of this Note.
85. A recent decision by the Vermont Supreme Court requiring its legislature either
to implement a domestic partnership program or to recognize gay marriages may fuel
another round of litigation under the marriage provision. See Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt.
194,225-26 (1999).
86. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1428; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261;
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927; see cf. Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1134.
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illegitimate government purpose.' They further maintain that the
government's justifications for the ban - to promote unit cohesion,
to protect heterosexual privacy, and to reduce sexual tensions - are
not rationally related to the Policy's prohibition on homosexual
conduct.'
The Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have sided with
the government and have upheld the Policy under the Equal
Protection Clause. Applying rational basis review, these courts ruled
that the government has a legitimate interest in fostering discipline
and combat readiness by promoting unit cohesion, increasing privacy,
and reducing sexual tensions.' They also concluded that the Policy
was rationally related to these legitimate government interests.90
In so doing, the courts reasoned that deference to the political
branches mandates upholding the Policy. They explained that
rational basis review requires deference to the legislature's
judgment.9  Because the President and Congress agree that
homosexual conduct detrimentally affects unit cohesion, courts
should respect the political branches' conclusions.' The courts
further stressed that legislation involving the military should be given
more deference than legislation concerning civilian matters.93 The
courts agreed that the Constitution grants the executive and
legislative branches power to regulate the military; because the
military is a specialized community, and because the judiciary lacks
competence in military matters, it should respect the President,
Congress, and the military experts' solution to a controversial and
political issue.94
In their decisions to uphold the Policy, the courts of appeals
87. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1428; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261;
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927; cf. Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1134.
88. See Able, 155 F.3d at 635; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1133; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1424;
Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 262; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930.
89. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1133; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1424;
Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 262; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930.
90. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Holmes, 124 .3d at 1133; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1424;
Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 262; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930.
91. See Able 155 F.3d at 632-34; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132-33; Philips, 106 F.3d at1424-
25; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-926.
92. See Able 155 F.3d at 632-34; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132-33; Philips, 106 F.3d at1424-
25; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-926.
93. See Able 155 F.3d at 632-34; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132-33; Philips, 106 F.3d at1424-
25; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-926.
94. See Able 155 F.3d at 632-34; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132-33; Philips, 106 F.3d at1424-
25; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921-926.
[Vol. 28
IRRATIONAL PREJUDICE
either have ignored Romer and other cases applying heightened
rationality, or have confined them to their facts; three of the four
circuit courts had the guidance of Romer, but refused to use it." The
courts of appeals that discussed Romer or its predecessors
distinguished those cases from the Policy as being status-based, not
conduct-based," and as not involving military matters.' The Ninth
Circuit stated that whereas Romer and its predecessors were cases
that involved mere prejudice, the Policy involved prejudice as well as
other purposes that were legitimate."
The courts of appeals' decisions have not been unanimous,
however, as evidenced by two forceful dissents. Both dissents used
Romer or its predecessors to argue that the Policy violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Discussing the statement provision, Judge Hall of
the Fourth Circuit noted that the legislative history shows prejudice
against homosexuals as a motivating factor for the Policy."°
Moreover, Judge Hall observed that the Policy, on its face, relies on
prejudice of heterosexual service members as a basis for excluding
homosexual service members.' This reliance, Judge Hall concluded,
is not a legitimate governmental purpose.' 2 Therefore, Judge Hall
would have held the Policy unconstitutional.'"
Discussing the act provision, Judge Betty Fletcher of the Ninth
Circuit argued that the Policy violates the Equal Protection Clause
even under rational basis review. She framed the constitutional issue
as "differential treatment of same-sex sexual activity and opposite-sex
sexual activity.""' She reasoned that the only way that gay, lesbian,
and bisexual service members could conceivably disrupt unit
cohesion, retention, recruitment, morale, and discipline is through
other service members' negative reactions to homosexuality. 5
95. See Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 260 n.5 (relegating Romer to a footnote about sexual
orientation classification not receiving heightened scrutiny); Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427
(discussing only Romer's predecessors) Holmes, 124 F.3d 1126.
96. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427.
97. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427.
98. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1428.
99. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting); Philips, 106 F.3d 1432
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
100. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting).
101. See id at 951.
102. See id. at 950.
103. See idt at 954.
104. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420,1432 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
105. See id at 1435.
Winter 2001]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Accommodating these biases, she continued, is not a legitimate
purpose. 6 She further contended that differentiating between the
private sexual activities of homosexual and heterosexual service
members is not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.1#
Judge Fletcher's analysis, while applying the framework of
heightened rationality, hinted that the Policy discriminates not only
on sexual orientation, but also on sex. She observed that the
petitioner "would not have been discharged had his sexual partners
been women rather than men.""+ Whether the Policy discriminates
merely on sexual orientation, or also on sex, is an important issue. If
the Policy discriminates based on sex, then intermediate review is
appropriate. Although she stops short of labeling the discrimination
sex-based, Judge Fletcher applies a form of heightened scrutiny in her
analysis. The issue of sexual orientation discrimination as a form of
sex discrimination will be discussed later in this Note."
II. The Courts' Reluctance to Apply Romer v. Evans to the
Policy
Courts appear to be unwilling to apply Romer and its
predecessors to the Policy for three main reasons. First, Romer does
not involve the military. Second, it is unclear in what circumstances
heightened rationality should apply. Third, it is unclear how Romer
relates to Bowers v. Hardwick."° This Note argues, however, that
these concerns do not present insurmountable obstacles.
106. See id. at 1435-36.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1433.
109. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
110. 478 U.S. 186, 192. Some critics note that Romer v. Evans and Bowers v. Hardwick
are inconsistent. Dissenting in Romer, Justice Scalia charged the majority xith ignoring
Hardwick without providing any explanation whatsoever. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636. In
Hardwick, the Court held that homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to engage in
private, consensual sexual activities with someone of the same sex. See 478 U.S. at 192.
Because a state may make it a crime for homosexuals to have sex in the privacy of their
own home, the argument continues, a state may surely withdraw benefits or protections to
those very class of persons. See id. This argument is unpersuasive. Justice Scalia and
other critics combine the line of precedents dealing with suspect classifications and those
dealing with fundamental rights. These two lines of equal protection jurisprudence should
be analyzed separately. Despite the overlap, however, Romer controls in terms of the
doctrine of stare decisis to the extent that Hardwick is inconsistent with Romer.
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A. Military Deference and the Policy
1. Policies Underlying Military Deference
Courts seem reluctant to apply Romer in the military context.
This reluctance is grounded on three concerns: the military as a
specialized community, the incompetence of courts in military
matters, and the doctrine of separation of powers. Courts recognize
that the military is a separate community from civilian society."' The
primary business of the military is to fight wars."' The necessity of
preparing for or fighting a war demands that certain rights of the
individual be sacrificed and others be curbed. Moreover, courts
acknowledge that military matters in general are beyond the scope of
their expertise;"' "[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of military
force... [should be left to] ... professional military judgments.
11 4
In addition, courts are cautious to exercise their discretion in the
military context because of separation of powers concerns."' The
United States Constitution explicitly grants the executive and
legislative branches power to regulate the military. It provides
Congress with the power to declare war and to raise, support, and
maintain the Armed Forces. 6 It also designates the President as the
commander-in-chief."7 The Constitution is silent, however, about the
role of the judiciary in regulating the military. This silence has been
interpreted as a sign that the Constitution requires courts to play a
less active role than the other branches when it comes to military
matters."8
These concerns have been translated into the doctrine of military
deference. One way to understand the operation of military
deference is through the "thumb on the scale" analogy; military
deference is like the court's thumb on the government's side of the
scale." 9  If the government establishes that its classification is
111. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,94 (1953).
112. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,743 (1974) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
113. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981).
114. Ide (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,10 (1973)).
115. See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
116. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11-13.
117. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, c. 1.
118. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 633 (2d Cir. 1998).
119. See Harris, supra note 80, at 208.
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sufficiently linked to a core military function (i.e. fighting or
preparing for war), then the thumb remains on the scale and the court
defers to the classification. 2' On the other hand, if the government
fails to establish a sufficient link, then the Court lifts its thumb, and
the bare classification is balanced against the individual's interests.'
2. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Military Deference
Three Supreme Court decisions have dealt specifically with equal
protection challenges to military classifications." The first two reveal
very little about the operation of military deference." In the third
decision, Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court provided a glimpse into the
operation of military deference in the context of equal protection
challenges." Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority, held that
the Military Selective Service Act, which authorizes the President to
require the registration of males and not females, does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause."z The holding rests upon two alternate
grounds.'26 Under the relevant ground for this analysis, Justice
120. See id. at 209.
121. See id.
122. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
123. In 1973, the Court held that a statute providing benefits to a male service
member's spouse but not to a female service member's spouse violates the Equal
Protection Clause. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In doing so, the
Court never mentioned the doctrine of military deference. Justice Rehnquist, the lone
dissenter, agreed with the lower court that military deference applied to the statute. See
id. at 691 (citing the reasons given by the lower court in Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp.
201 (1972)). The majority and concurring opinions solely disagreed about the standard of
scrutiny to be afforded classifications based on sex. Today, a classification based on sex is
given intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny as proposed in the majority opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690; see also, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Two years
later in a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a statutory scheme providing female naval
officers a longer tenure commissioned service than male naval officers before mandatory
discharge for want of promotion does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975). Again, the Court ignored the military
deference doctrine in its central holding. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court briefly
mentions military deference at the end of its opinion as an afterthought, but did not rely
on it for its central holding. Id. Instead, the Court reasoned that a female line officer is
not similarly situated to a male line officer with respect to opportunities for professional
service; therefore, the military's classifications passed muster under rational basis review.
See id. at 508-09.
124. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
125. See id. at 83.
126. Alternately, the majority reasoned that because men and women are not similarly
situated "for the purpose of a draft or registration of a draft," the classification was
rationally related to the purpose of the registration statute. Id. at 78-79.
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Rehnquist reasoned that because the classification is based upon a
core military function (i.e. registration of combat troops), the statute
should be afforded military deference.27 In doing so, he meticulously
combed through the legislative history of the statute, albeit
subsequent to its enactment, and found that Congress had extensively
considered the issue of women in combat."8 Therefore, he reasoned,
military deference required that the Court not substitute its judgment
for that of Congress.9
In its most recent pronouncement on military deference, the
Court failed to provide further guidance. In Goldman v. Weinberger,
a First Amendment challenge to the military's dress code, the Court
deferred to the judgment of the military in not allowing a service
member to wear his yarmulke with his military gear."' Of the five
Justices who supported the result, three agreed with Justice Stevens's
position on military deference while only two supported Justice
Rehnquist's. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the lead opinion,
reiterated his position in Rostker; he observed that the Air Force
considered "that the traditional outfitting of personnel in
standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal
preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission.'' He
further observed that the Air Force used its professional judgment
about uniformity to promulgate a detailed dress regulation."'
Therefore, he concluded, the Court would not substitute its judgment
for that of the Air Force. Justice Rehnquist suggested that as long
as the appropriate authority, whether the President, Congress, or a
military expert, has considered the issue at hand, the Court will defer
to that judgment.'3
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Rehnquist's conclusion, but
added that the military judgment must also be neutral and completely
objective. Justice Stevens wrote separately to explain that the
regulation's objectiveness furthered uniformity, a core military
127. See id- at 67, 70-71.
128. See id. at 72-77.
129. See id. at 68.
130. 475 U.S. 503,510 (1986).
131. Id. at 508.
132. See id. at 508-09.
133. See id. at 509 ("The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by
the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to
abandon their considered professional judgment.").
134. See it
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value.13' He accepted as "plausible" the military's judgment on
uniformity, even though he had some reservations about it. 1" 6 He
explained that at first glance, the regulation seems to only punish
Captain Goldman for wearing his yarmulke, a symbol of his religious
belief." However, he continued, the dress regulation must be tested
as against all service members who have religious beliefs that may
conflict with military commands." With that in mind, Justice Stevens
argued the interest in uniformity supports the "uniform treatment of
members of all religious faiths.' 39 Therefore, he contended, the
neutral and objective dress regulation, untainted "by hostility against,
or any special respect for, any religious faith," was closely linked to a
core military function - uniformity.'4°
The dissenters' opinions also varied as to the operation of the
military deference doctrine. Justice Brennan contended that the
government must give a credible explanation of the military interests
and the classification before the Court can defer to its judgment . 41 To
that extent, Justice Blackmun, who dissented separately, agreed with
Justice Brennan. 2  Justice Brennan also accused the majority of
abandoning the Court's "constitutionally mandated role.',
43
Although he accepted the principles behind deference, he argued that
military deference does not mean an "absolute, uncritical" acceptance
of military judgment 44
Justice O'Connor argued, in a strongly worded dissent, that
military deference should not be a separate doctrine, but instead
should be analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis. Justice O'Connor
marveled that "[i]t is entirely sufficient for the [majority] if the
135. See id. at 512.
136. See id. ("Because professionals in the military service attach great importance to
that plausible interest, it is one that we must recognize as legitimate and rational even
though personal experience or admiration for the performance of 'rag-tag band of
soldiers' that won our freedom in the Revolutionary War might persuade us that the
Government has exaggerated the importance of that interest.").
137. See id. at 511.
138. See id. at 511-12.
139. Id. at 512.
140. Id. at 513.
141. See id. at 516.
142. See id. at 526 ("[T]he Air Force has failed to produce even a minimally credible
explanation for its refusal to allow Goldman to keep his head covered indoors.").
143. Id. at 515.
144. Id. at 516.
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military perceives a need for uniformity"'45 to defer to the military.
Justice O'Connor argued that the correct approach to the issue at
hand was to "articulate and apply an appropriate standard for a free
exercise claim in the military context."'146
Goldman has injected more confusion into an already ambiguous
doctrine. Commentators, a well as the lower courts, are puzzled
about the operation of the military deference doctrine.47 Some
commentators have tried to draw a coherent standard of deference
from the case law. Some critics have read Goldman to stand for a
severe application of military deference, or a virtual abdication of
judicial review for military matters.48 Others have suggested that
Justice Rehnquist's view on military deference did not expressly
abdicate judicial review, but required a "minimal" relationship
between the classification and a core military. function.149 These critics
add that Justice Stevens's position on military deference required at
least a "reasonable," if not "substantial" relationship between core
military function and the classification."5
Even though Justice Stevens's position on military deference
prevailed, it is by no means safe from challenge. In fact, Goldman
appears to have little precedential value due to its fractured outcome.
Nevertheless, of the four standards of military difference articulated
in Goldman, Justice Stevens's standard is the most palatable because
it considers the interests of both the individual and the military.
Justice O'Connor's position is too burdensome, as her opinion
seems to suggest that the doctrine of military deference should be
applied differently in each case depending on the claim asserted.'
The implication from this position is that every claim, from first
amendment to equal protection, deserves a different standard of
review from its civilian counterpart. The advantage of this position is
145. Id. at 528.
146. Id. at 529.
147. See, e.g., John Nelson Ohlweiler, The Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional
Challenges to Military Regulations, 10 J.L. & POLY. 147 (1993); Kirstin Dodge,
Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case Against Judicial Deference to the
Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 1 (1992).
148. See, e.g., Mary Jo Donahue, First Amendment Rights in the Military Context: What
Deference is Due? - Goldman v. Weignberger, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 85,104 (1986).
149. See Harris, supra note 80, at 214; see Ohlweiler, supra note 147, at 169.
150. See Harris, supra note 80, at 215; Ohlweiler, supra note 147, at 169.
151. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 529 ("[T]he Court should attempt to articulate and
apply an appropriate standard for a free exercise claim in the military context.... ."). This
position does find support in Parker v. Levy, where the Court set a higher standard for
constitutional vagueness challenges in the military context. See 417 U.S. 733,756 (1974).
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that an individual's interest would always be considered before the
Court defers to the military judgment. The disadvantage is that it is
inefficient; the Court would have to modify each and every civilian
standard to fit the military context. This inefficiency might harm the
military mission more than help individual interests.
Both Justice Brennan's and Justice Rehnquist's positions are
inadequate for opposite reasons. Justice Brennan's standard does not
adequately consider the military's interests. He requires the military
to show that there is a credible link between the classification and the
military interests.152 If the Court determines that a credible link exists,
then it will defer to the military judgment.'53 This test, however, is in
effect no deference at all. It requires the military expert, Congress, or
the President to explain to the Court's satisfaction why certain
regulations and statutes that affect the preparing and fighting of wars
are necessary. Justice Brennan's standard fails to address the three
underlying principles behind military deference: the courts' lack of
competence, the doctrine of separation of powers, and military as a
specialized community.
Justice Rehnquist, who has been instrumental in shaping the
military deference doctrine, has articulated a standard that does not
adequately consider the individual's interests. In both Rostker and
Goldman, Rehnquist appears to suggest that as long as the
appropriate authority - the President, Congress, or military expert
- has considered the disputed issue, then the Court will defer to that
judgment. In Rostker, it was enough that Congress considered the
issue of women in combat in the subsequent legislative history of the
registration statute;" in Goldman, it was sufficient that the Navy
considered the uniformity of its service members and promulgated a
detailed dress regulation addressing religious gear.' Justice
Rehnquist's balancing of interests goes too far in favoring the
military. Although Justice Rehnquist does not propose to abrogate
judicial review on constitutional matters involving the military, he rigs
the scale to the detriment of individual interests.
Justice Stevens articulates the most balanced approach,
sufficiently accounting for both the individual and military interests.
Justice Stevens appears to agree with Justice Rehnquist that the
Court should defer to the military judgment in the first instance if the
152. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516.
153. See id.
154. See Rostker, 453 U.S. 57,68,72-77 (1981).
155. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508-09.
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appropriate authority has decided the issue at hand.156 However, he
additionally requires that the judgment be neutral, and completely
objective, with no evidence of hostility toward any one group. 57 The
first step of the test accounts for the three underlying policies behind
military deference and relies on military expertise. The second step
takes into account the individual's interests and relies on the Court's
expertise.
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Stevens's positions diverge in an
important way. A hypothetical may help explain the difference.
Suppose that the President, Congress, and military experts want to re-
segregate the military. They think that single-race units would
promote unit cohesion and discipline. Many top officers of the
Armed Forces testify before Congress that white soldiers do not want
to serve next to African-American or Asian-American soldiers, and
therefore, unit cohesion is compromised. After extensive hearings,
Congress passes the Re-Segregation Act. African-American service
members challenge the Act under the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Rehnquist's position, unlike Justice Stevens's, would
defer to the military judgment. According to Justice Rehnquist's
position, it is enough that the President, Congress, and the military
experts have decided the issue at hand. The Court cannot and should
not substitute its judgment for that of the military experts. On the
other hand, Justice Stevens's position would defer to the military's
expertise on the issue that segregation would promote unit cohesion.
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens's position would require the statute to
be completely neutral and objective without any hostility toward any
group. The Re-Segregation Act would fail here because it is
motivated by animus toward non-white soldiers. As a result, Justice
Stevens's would allow African-American service members to litigate
their equal protection claim instead of deferring to the military.
3. Application of Justice Stevens's Standard to the Policy
Because Justice Stevens's standard accounts for both individual
and military interests, it is the best standard of the four articulated in
Goldman. Using Justice Steven's standard, a court would not defer to
the military regarding the Policy. In the first step of the inquiry, the
court would ask whether the appropriate authority has considered the
issue at hand. The military claims that homosexual conduct disrupts
unit cohesion, and Congress has passed the Policy after extensive
156. See id. at 512.
157. See id. at 513.
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hearings.'58 Justice Stevens's standard would initially defer to that
military judgment.
In the second step of the inquiry, a court would ask whether the
judgment is completely neutral and objective, and absent hostility
toward any one group. Here, the Court makes an independent
assessment. The Policy is not neutral and objective because it does
not punish heterosexual service members who engage in homosexual
conduct in the same way as it does gay service members who engage
in homosexual conduct. First, heterosexual service members may
escape discharge by claming the "Queen for a Day" exception,5 9
whereby the military may retain a service member who commits
homosexual act if she can prove that she does not have a "propensity"
to commit homosexual acts."6 Gay service members cannot claim this
exception. Second, heterosexual service members who marry are not
discharged whereas gay service members who marry or attempt to
marry are discharged. The disparity in treatment between service
members of different sexual orientations shows that the Policy is not
neutral and completely objective.
Moreover, the Policy is motivated by animus toward gay service
members. That is, unit cohesion is affected only because the military
claims that heterosexual service members would not be able to work
next to a known gay service member. Because the Policy is not
completely neutral and objective, with no evidence of hostility toward
any one group, a court applying Justice Stevens's standard would not
give military deference to the Policy. Therefore, a court would lift its
thumb from the scale and scrutinize the Policy under traditional equal
protection analysis.
B. Heightened Rationality and the Policy
1. Factors That Push the Supreme Court Toward Heightened Rationality
No majority Supreme Court decision has acknowledged applying
heightened rationality when invalidating a law that does not involve a
suspect class or a fundamental right. From 1973 to 1996, of
approximately 110 cases in which the Court has applied the rational
158. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
159. This particularly colorful term is borrowed from the Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network, Survival Guide, (visited Mar. 18. 2001)
<http://www.sldn.orgtemplates/get/record.html?record=68>.
160. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1).
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basis review, it has invalidated about ten.' Although the Court has
purported to use rational basis review to invalidate those laws,
commentators have noted that it has applied a more searching
review.62 That more searching review, however, has been used
sparingly and inconsistently.'"
Even with these inconsistencies, patterns have emerged. First,
when the Court is contemplating whether to formally apply
heightened scrutiny to a classification or a right, it will use heightened
rationality as a stepping-stone.'" Second, the Court uses heightened
rationality when the right seems fundamental-like, 65 the classification
seems suspect-like,'6 or when the law is motivated by animus.67 This
Note focuses on the second approach.
a. Fundamental-like Rights
The Court may apply heightened rationality when a law infringes
on a quasi-fundamental right. Some liberties are so important that
the Court deems them fundamental and evaluates them under the
Equal Protection Clause by using strict scrutiny. Examples of those
rights include the right to vote,'" the right to travel,69 and the right to
privacy.'70  Those rights may be explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, within the framers' intent, or implicitly derived from the
Constitution.'
161. See Farrell, supra note 77, at 370.
162. See, e.g., id. at 411.
163. See, e.g., id
164. Some formal heightened review cases began as heightened rationality cases.
Before the Court formally applied intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex, it
invalidated gender exclusion laws under heightened rationality review. See Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). In addition, laws discriminating against children who were born
out of wedlock were struck down first under heightened rationality, then subsequently
under intermediate review. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972);
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Initially applying heightened rationality review to
these types of cases affords the Court time to shape equal protection jurisprudence while
addressing individual instances of injustice.
165. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S.
14 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
166. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
167. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Plyer, 457 U.S. 202;
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
168. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757 (1966).
170. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
171. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977).
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For example, the Court has applied the fundamental right to
travel in evaluating laws that impose durational residency
requirements." A durational residency requirement allows a person
to receive benefits only after residing in the jurisdiction for a specified
amount of time."' These requirements assure that only persons who
establish bona fide residency may receive state benefits." Because
the Court has observed that these requirements discourage interstate
travel and migration, it has applied strict scrutiny in analyzing them.75
Heightened rationality review may be appropriate where
legislation favors more-established over less-established residents,
thereby indirectly affecting interstate migration. The Court has used
heightened rationality to invalidate two state statutes that
discriminated against newer residents but did not implicate the
fundamental right to travel. In 1980, the Alaskan legislature enacted
a dividend program to distribute income derived from its natural
resources to citizens in varying amounts based on the length of each
citizen's residency. 76 Similarly, in 1983, the New Mexico legislature
enacted a statute granting property tax exemption to veterans
residing in state before a specified date.i" Both statutes sought to
favor more established over less-established residents.
178
In both cases the Court was particularly cognizant of the state
laws' indirect affect on the fundamental right to travel. Although it
distinguished the two statutes from laws that impose durational
172. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,254 (1975).
173. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,58 (1982).
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 254.
176. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 56. The three rejected government purposes: -(a) creation
of a financial incentive for individuals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; (b)
encouragement of prudent management of the Permanent Fund; and (c) apportionment of
benefits in recognition of undefined 'contributions of various kinds, both tangible and
intangible, which residents have made during their years of residency.' " Id. at 60.
177. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 614 (1985). The rejected
government purposes included encouraging Vietnam veterans to move to New Mexico
and rewarding veterans for their military service. See id. at 619-20.
178. A third case has features of a quasi-fundamental right, but is not as fundamental-
like as the rights at issue in Zobel and Hooper. In 1981, a Vermont statute sought to
collect a use tax when cars were registered in state. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14,
15 (1985). It did not impose the tax if the car was purchased in Vermont and a sales tax
was paid, or it reduced the tax if another state would afford a credit for taxes paid to
Vermont in similar circumstances. See id. The credit, however, was available only if the
registrants were Vermont residents at the time they paid the taxes. See id. The Supreme
Court ruled that the Vermont statute violated the Equal Protection Clause under rational
basis review. See id.
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residency requirements,179 it nevertheless observed that the state
statutes created "'fixed, permanent distinctions between classes.., of
concededly bona fide residents' based on when they arrived in the
State."" In the durational residency requirement setting, requiring
people to live in a state for a certain amount of time in order to
receive benefits affects their decision to remain in and others'
decision to establish residency in the state. Likewise, legislation like
the Alaska and New Mexico statutes favoring more established over
less established residents affects the less established residents'
decisions to remain in and others' decisions to move to that state."'
Even though the Court expressly rejected applying strict scrutiny to
distinctions like those in the Alaska and New Mexico statutes, it
suggested that those classifications would be scrutinized more closely
than other economic legislation because of their effect on the right to
travel.
Heightened rationality may also be appropriate when a law
denies education to a whole class of children. The Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a Texas statute withholding funds from local
school districts for education of children not legally admitted into the
United States and authorizing districts to deny enrollment of such
children." Even though the Court found that public education is not
a fundamental right, 3 it noted "education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society," and is "the very foundation of
good citizenship."' '  Hence, the Court suggested that legislation
179. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 58; Hooper, 472 U.S. at 614.
180. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 617 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59).
181. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Hooper, 472 U.S. at 624
(Brennan, J., concurring). Arguably, the second situation may discourage interstate travel
more than the first. In the first situation, a person who has fulfilled the durational
residency requirement will receive the same benefits as those who came before. In the
second, however, the less established resident will either receive reduced benefits, as in the
Alaskan case, or receives no benefits, as in the New Mexico case. Hence, a waiting period
may discourage migration less than perpetually inferior benefits.
182. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,230 (1982).
183. See i& at 221 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988)).
184. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall found that the
right to an education is fundamental:
Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of a child, mark the distinction. The
"American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance." We have recognized "the public
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values
on which our society rest." "[As]... pointed our early in our history .... some
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excluding a whole class from public education should be analyzed
with suspicion because education is a quasi-fundamental right.
Heightened rationality may also be appropriate where legislation
indirectly affects the right to vote. The Constitution forbids voting
discrimination." The Supreme Court has declared that the right to
vote is fundamental because it is the foundation of the democratic
process."' The right to vote is not only a form of self-expression, it is
also a form of self-preservation." That is, the right to vote allows
individuals to choose a government that will safeguard and promote
their interests."
Individuals are presumed to have an interest in the political
process, regardless of their wealth. Hence, laws requiring property
ownership as a requirement for voting are anathema to the
democratic process." 9  Similarly, laws that require real property
ownership in order to serve on a governmental board or commission
subvert the democratic process."9 Using this reasoning, the Supreme
Court unanimously invalidated a Missouri constitutional provision
that allowed a board consisting of real property owners to draft a plan
to reorganize the city or county government.' Although the Court
did not apply strict scrutiny, it suggested that the real-property
requirement for governmental board positions warranted a more
searching review than minimal rationality.
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence."
Id. at 230 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged on account of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (right of citizens of the United
States to vote in any primary or other election shall not be denied or abridged for failure
to pay any poll tax or other tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not ba denied or
abridged on account of age).
186. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,555 (1964).
187. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer, 395
U.S. at 633.
190. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,362 (1970).
191. See Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 96, 108 (1989). The Court in Quilm v. Millsap
rejected governmental purposes: real-property owners have a "first-hand knowledge of
the value of good schools, sewer systems and the other problems and amenities of urban
life," they also have "a tangible stake in the long term future of [their] area." Id. at 107.
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Heightened rationality may be appropriate when the wholesale
denial of protection for a class of people indirectly impinges on that
class's voting right. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a Colorado amendment that prohibited all
legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local
government designed to protect gays and lesbians.1" The Colorado
Supreme Court overturned Amendment 2, holding that the
amendment was subject to strict scrutiny because it infringed the
fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political
process.93 Although the United States Supreme Court did not
explicitly rely on the voting cases," instead upholding the decision on
other grounds, it recognized that the expansive amendment would
inflict a catastrophic legal harm on gays and lesbians.95 The Court
observed that the amendment would withdraw from gays and lesbians
"protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society."'" Withdrawing from a class its ability to express and
preserve its interests and liberties seems to infringe indirectly upon
the class's right to vote. Although the Court did not accept the
Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning, it suggested that a law that
imposes a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group should be analyzed closely.
b. Suspect-like Classifications
Heightened rationality is appropriate when legislation infringes
upon a suspect-like class. The Supreme Court grants heightened
review for suspect and quasi-suspect classifications when the class
exhibits immutable characteristics,"9 has been excluded from the
political process," or suffers a history of discrimination.' The idea is
that it is unfair to discriminate against a person on the basis of a
characteristic that she did not choose or cannot change. Likewise, it
is unfair to disadvantage a person who cannot protect her own
192- See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,624 (1996).
193. See id. (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)).
194. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
195. See id. at 627 ("Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.").
196. Id at 631.
197. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448,496 (1980).
198. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,367 (1971).
199. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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interests in the political process. As a result, the Court grants special
protection to those who have suffered a history of discrimination
based upon unfair prejudice.
Three heightened rationality cases involved suspect-like
classifications. The Court carefully scrutinized laws that harmed the
mentally retarded, undocumented children, and gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals. In 1985, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that
required the operator of a group home for the mentally retarded to
apply for a special use permit.' Although the Court rejected
classifying the mentally retarded as quasi-suspect,' i it nevertheless
recognized that mental retardation is an immutable condition,' that
mentally retarded people suffer a history of "antipathy" or
"prejudice,"' and that they have a "reduced ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world.""+ These factors seem to have
motivated the Court to analyze the ordinance more closely than it
would otherwise under rational basis review.
Undocumented children are also a suspect-like class. In 1982,
the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute that allowed local
schools to deny enrollment to undocumented children, and withheld
state funding from schools for education of such children.'5
Undocumented aliens undeniably cannot participate in the political
process. Moreover, they suffer a history of discrimination, especially
in times of low economic activity. Their undocumented status,
however, is not immutable "because it is a product of conscious...
action.'" The Court observed that the law does not target the
undocumented adults, who presumably are not a suspect class, but
rather their children, who "have little control" over their status.'
Though the Court never mentioned the level of scrutiny it applied, it
noted that the Texas law would "impose a lifetime of hardship on a
discrete class of children not accountable for their disability."'  The
law's expansive nature and its burden on a class of individuals who
have no control over their status led the Court to apply heightened
200. See id. at 450.
201. See id. at 442.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 443.
204. See id. at 442.
205. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,230 (1982).
206. Id. at 220.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 223.
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rationality.
Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals belong to a class that is suspect-like.
In 1996, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment
prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to
protect gays and lesbians.' Although the Court did not discuss the
factors that make gays, lesbians, and bisexuals a suspect-like class,
these factors were present and may have influenced the outcome.
Sexual orientation is for the most part immutable. In addition, gays
and lesbians have suffered a history of discrimination and have in the
past been excluded from the political process. Although the Court
used rational basis review to invalidate Colorado's amendment, the
outcome suggests that laws discriminating against homosexuals might
be looked at more closely.
c. Classifications Based on Animus or Prejudice
The United States Supreme Court has indicated in no uncertain
terms that government classifications based on animus or prejudice
are constitutionally unacceptable. In Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme
Court held that a state court impermissibly considered private
prejudices in its decision to award custody to a parent."1 In Palmore,
a white father sought custody of his child after the child's white
mother began living with, and subsequently married, a black man.2
The state court granted the father custody of the child because it
found that the child would "suffer from the social stigmatization" of
having interracial parents. 4  In holding the state court decision
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme
Court observed: "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.
, ,215
The Supreme Court appears to have extended its reasoning in
Palmore to encompass classifications other than race and to prohibit
209. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
210. See Kurt Hermansen, Analyzing the Military's Justifications for its Exclusionary
Policy: Fifty Years Without a Rational Basis, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151,172-74 (1992).
211. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) (describing the history of discrimination against gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals).
212. See 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
213. See id. at 430.
214. See id. at 431.
215. Id at 433.
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inferred animus in addition to express animus. Four heightened
rationality cases involve laws that are motivated by animus or
prejudice. These laws implicitly or explicitly justify discriminating
against hippies,216 the mentally retarded, 17 undocumented children,21
and gays and lesbians"9 because others do not like them. In 1973, the
Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that was intended to
prevent hippies and hippie communes from participating in the food
stamp program." In so doing, the Court noted that if "the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."'" This and the other cases suggest
laws that are, at bottom, motivated by animus should be closely
analyzed, even though they do not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect
class or a fundamental right.
2. The Policy is a Candidate for Heightened Rationality
The Court seems to use heightened rationality when the
classification is suspect-like, the right fundamental-like, or the law is
motivated by animus. As the previous discussion indicates, some
heightened rationality cases implicate more than one category. In
those cases, the Supreme Court is more inclined to apply heightened
rationality. For example, with the help of twenty-twenty hindsight,
the result in Romer appears predictable: it falls into all three
categories. The Policy also implicates all three categories, presenting
a perfect candidate for heightened rationality review.
a. The Policy Infringes Upon Fundamental-like Rights
The Policy infringes upon fundamental-like rights such as
military service and the right to marry.
216. See United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
217. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
218. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,230 (1982).
219. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
220. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
221. Id.
222. At least one commentator has argued that military service is a fundamental right.
See Carl Riehl, Uncle Sam Has To Want You: The Right of Gay Men and Lesbians (and
All Other Americans) To Bear Arms in the Military, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 343 (1995).
[Vol. 28
IRRATIONAL PREJUDICE
1) Military Service as a Fundamental-like Right
Military service is a quasi-fundamental right that is supported by
the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment reads: "A well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'
Professor Akhil Amar argues that historically the right to bear
arms conferred by the Second Amendment belonged to citizens, as a
collective, to protect themselves from the specter of a federal standing
army.' 4 He notes that the right to bear arms is closely connected to
the "idea of popular sovereignty." ' In the nineteenth century, the
rights to bear arms, along with the rights to vote, hold public office,
and serve on juries, were viewed as political rights belonging to
citizens, which excluded alien men and single white women.
6
Professor Amar, therefore, suggests that the right to bear arms
historically has been included in the bundle of rights called
citizenship. 7
Today, military service is intertwined with concepts of
citizenship. Military service signifies to the public that one is a
citizen, a defender of American values. Therefore, it is no surprise
that black service members wanted to fight side-by-side with white
service members, and female service members desire to serve in
combat units. Full-fledged membership in the military appears to be
part of the bundle of rights that constitute citizenship, and thus
constitutes a fundamental-like right.
2) Same-sex Marriage as a Fundamental-like Right
Same-sex marriage is also a fundamental-like right. The Supreme
Court has recognized that marriage in a heterosexual content is a
basic civil right that is fundamental to the existence and survival of
the human race.' It has confirmed the fundamental nature of
marriage even with respect to prison inmates. According to the
Court, inmates retain the constitutional right to marry even though
223. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
224. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1172 (1991).
225. See idL at 1164.
226. See id.
227. See idL
228. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
383-84 (1978).
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prison life limits many important attributes of marriage. 9 It observed
that "inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional
support and public commitment,"' and that "many religions
recognize marriage as having spiritual significance"' Marriage, thus,
extends to all, even to those with severely abridged rights.
Same-sex marriages serve the same function in society as
opposite-sex marriages. Same-sex marriage is a union between two
committed people. Same-sex unions are expressions of emotional
and public commitment. Family members and others within the
community have often extended their blessings to these unions.
These unions, moreover, have produced stable family units that
include children and grandchildren.z2 Although same-sex marriages
do not enjoy the same legal status as opposite-sex marriages, they are
a form of religious expression for some couples. 3 In addition, more
and more religious traditions are endorsing and treating these unions
on par with opposite-sex unions.'
To date, no state in the union extends legal marriage status to
same-sex couples.z5 In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
state's refusal to grant same-sex marriage licenses required a
compelling state justification to survive scrutiny under the state's
Equal Rights Amendment. 6 On remand, the trial court held that the
state could not justify denying same-sex couples marriage licenses. In
1996, however, Hawaii voters passed an amendment to their
constitution that gave the legislature the authority to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.z7 As a result, opposite-sex only
marriage remains the status quo. In light of the dispute in Hawaii,
thirty-one states have enacted laws preventing any future same-sex
229. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95-96 (1987).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Win for Same-Sex Couples Dutch Law Allows Them to Marry, Adopt
Children, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 21, 2000, at A17.
233. See Mindy Cameron, And the Next Generation Shall Teach - and Lead, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 23,2000, at D2.
234. See Patricia Rice, Presbyterian Leaders Here Will Vote on Same Sex Unions; But
National Church Won't Ban Such Ceremonies, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 16,2001,
at BI.
235. The Netherlands became the first country to grant same-sex couples marriage
licenses. See Win for Same-sex Couples, supra note 232, at A17.
236. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530,561-71 (1993).
237. See Beahr v. Miike, 92 Haw. 634 (1999).
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marriages of another state from being recognized in their states.m
Vermont is the first state to recognize that same-sex couples
should receive the same state benefits as opposite-sex couples. In
1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state is required to
extend the same benefits to same-sex unions as it does to opposite-sex
marriages under the Common Benefits Clause of Vermont's
Constitution.' 9  In so holding, the Court gave the legislature the
option of granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples or
implementing a parallel system that extended all to same-sex couples
all of the state benefits that come with a marriage license.2' The
legislature subsequently enacted the Civil Union Act,24 the first of its
238. See Eskridge, supra note 211, at 219. The thirty states are listed in Appendix B3.
See id. at 362-71. California is the thirty-first state to do so, passing Proposition 22, the
"Knight Initiative" in March, 2000. The proposition added the following language to the
Family Code: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California." CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2001).
239. See Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194,197 (1999).
240. See id.
241. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2001). "The purpose of this act is to
respond to the constitutional violation found by the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v.
State, and to provide eligible same-sex couples the opportunity to 'obtain the same
benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples' as
required by Chapter I, Article 7th of the Vermont Constitution." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1201. The legislative findings provide:
(1) Civil marriage under Vermont's marriage statutes consists of a union between
a man and a woman. This interpretation of the state's marriage laws was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Baker v. State.
(2) Vermont's history as an independent republic and as a state is one of equal
treatment and respect for all Vermonters. This tradition is embodied in the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I, Article 7th.
(3) The state's interest in civil marriage is to encourage close and caring families,
and to protect all family members from the economic and social consequences of
abandonment and divorce, focusing on those who have been especially at risk.
(4) Legal recognition of civil marriage by the state is the primary and, in a
number of instances, the exclusive source of numerous benefits, responsibilities
and protections under the laws of the state for married persons and their
children.
(5) Based on the state's tradition of equality under the law and strong families,
for at least 25 years, Vermont Probate Courts have qualified gay and lesbian
individuals as adoptive parents.
(6) Vermont was one of the first states to adopt comprehensive legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Act No. 135 of
1992).
(7) The state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting families,
including families based upon a same-sex couple.
(8) Without the legal protections, benefits and responsibilities associated with
civil marriage, same-sex couples suffer numerous obstacles and hardships.
(9) Despite longstanding social and economic discrimination, many gay and
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kind in the United States.
In 1995, the Eleventh Circuit addressed same-sex marriage in the
context of the First Amendment. An Eleventh Circuit panel ruled
that it was unconstitutional for the Georgia Attorney General's office
to withdraw an offer of employment to an attorney because she
entered a same-sex marriage.242 The Court ruled that denying Robin
Shahar employment based on her religious same-sex marriage
ceremony violated her right to intimate association.243 This decision,
however, was short-lived. In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en
bane reversed the panel's 1995 decision.24
A hypothetical may help explain why the right to marry someone
of the same sex is at least fundamental-like. Suppose a service
member in Vermont enters into a legal civil union. Suppose also that
the military finds out and discharges the service member because she
has "married" or "attempted to marry" a partner of the same sex. If
the military's position is right, the service member must choose
between basic civil rights offered by Vermont to its citizens and
service in the military. Heterosexual service members are not put in
the same dilemma.
lesbian Vermonters have formed lasting, committed, caring and faithful
relationships with persons of their same sex. These couples live together,
participate in their communities together, and some raise children and care for
family members together, just as do couples who are married under Vermont
law.
(10) While a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil marriage, it
does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits Clause. Changes in the
way significant legal relationships are established under the constitution should
be approached carefully, combining respect for the community and cultural
institutions most affected with a commitment to the constitutional rights
involved. Granting benefits and protections to same-sex couples through a
system of civil unions will provide due respect for tradition and long-standing
social institutions, and will permit adjustment as unanticipated consequences or
unmet needs arise.
(11) The constitutional principle of equality embodied in the Common Benefits
Clause is compatible with the freedom of religious belief and worship guaranteed
in Chapter I, Article 3rd of the state constitution. Extending the benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples through a system of civil unions
preserves the fundamental constitutional. right of each of the multitude of
religious faiths in Vermont to choose freely and without state interference to
whom to grant the religious status, sacrament or blessing of marriage under the
rules, practices or traditions of such faith.
Id.
242. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995).
243. See id.
244. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097,1099 (11th Cir 1997) (en bane). In dicta, the




b. The Policy's Classification Seems Suspect-like
The Policy involves a suspect-like classification because it
excludes gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from service and is a form of
sex discrimination. Proponents of the Policy argue that the Supreme
Court has generally used heightened review on status-based
classifications.24 Because the Policy classifies service members based
on their conduct, not status, the argument continues, heightened
review is inappropriate. 6
Even assuming that the status/conduct dichotomy exists, 247 the
Policy nevertheless seeks to discriminate against homosexual service
members, not against what they do. Although the Policy purports to
discharge service members on the basis of homosexual conduct, the
Policy's definition of "homosexual conduct"2' reveals that it is, in
fact, directed at status. "Homosexual conduct" includes a statement
indicating a propensity to engage in homosexual activity, yet the
Policy carves out an exception for heterosexual service members who
engage in homosexual activity but do not have a propensity to engage
in such activity.24 9 "Conduct" is typically understood as personal
behavior or action, a definition that would not normally encompass a
statement of orientation. This definition clearly is directed at
excluding gay and lesbian service members for their sexual
orientation, while retaining heterosexual service members even if
they violate the prohibition on homosexual activity.
In reality, the Policy discharges only gays, lesbians, and bisexual
service members based on their orientation or status. If heterosexual
service members commit homosexual acts, they are excepted from the
Policy upon a showing that their actions depart from their usual
behavior.2 Gay service members, however, cannot use this
exception. As a result, heterosexual service members who commit
homosexual acts are not discharged, whereas homosexuals who
commit the same acts are discharged.
In addition, statements of homosexual orientation warrant
discharge if left unrebutted. To rebut the presumption of homosexual
conduct based on a statement of homosexual orientation, the service
245. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628,635 (2d Cir. 1998).
246. See Rice, supra note 234, at B1.
247. See, e.g., Patricia Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79
VA. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (1993).
248. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1999).
249. See id.
250. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1).
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member must show that he or she does not have a propensity to
engage in homosexual acts."' The Policy suggests that abstract
statements of homosexual orientation are not enough to support
separation, instead requiring that the statement demonstrate a
"propensity" or a likelihood that a service member engages in or will
engage in homosexual acts. 22 Successful rebuttal, therefore, entails
proving that one is either heterosexual or homosexual without a
"propensity" to commit homosexual acts. Although this might be
accomplished by proving, for example, commitment to a life of
celibacy, the distinction is nebulous and effectively excludes all gay
and lesbian service members.
If a policy, at bottom, discharges all known gays and only
discharges gays, it cannot truly be said that conduct is the basis for
exclusion. Because the Policy discharges only gays, it is status-based,
not conduct-based. By redefining homosexual conduct to include
unrebutted statements, the military sought to circumvent the
protections of both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clauses. A duck, however, does not cease to be a duck, even if you
call it "a thing that makes quacking noises." Likewise, the Policy
does not cease to be status-based just because it purports to exclude
based on "homosexual conduct."2 3 Because the Policy targets
homosexual service members, it is based on a suspect-like
classification. '
Sexual orientation discrimination is also suspect-like because it
may be a form of sex discrimination. For example, a male soldier
may marry a woman, but a female soldier may not marry her.
Likewise, a female service member may have sexual relations with a
man, but a male service member is forbidden to have sexual relations
with the same man. As between the two service members, the Policy
discriminates against one of them based on sex. The Policy,
therefore, appears to discriminate not only on sexual orientation, but
also on sex.'
251. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
252. Cf DODD 1332.14.
253. Labeling the Policy as propensity-based does not resolve the issue. A law should
not punish a person merely because he or she may likely commit an act. For example, a
person may not be incarcerated for having a violent disposition. She may, however, be
imprisoned because she committed a violent act.
254. See, e.g., Hermansen, supra note 210, at 172-75.
255. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 561-71 (1993). The analogy has succeeded in
the Hawaiian Supreme Court and has been accepted by some in the feminist community.
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Court held that denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
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Although the syllogism is attractive, some state supreme courts
have found it unpersuasive in the context of same-sex marriage and
sodomy laws. In the context of same-sex marriage, a state supreme
court reasoned that the ban on same-sex marriage applied to both
men and women equally because it prohibits both genders from
marrying a person of the same sex. 6 Similarly, another state supreme
court observed that its state sodomy law "applie[s] equally to men
and women because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual
activity with members of their own sex. ' ' 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, has accepted the
underlying logic behind the analogy. In 1964, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute prohibiting different-race couples from
cohabiting.25 Because the prohibition was based on the race of one of
the cohabiters or occupants, the Court held that the statute was race
discrimination. 9 Similarly in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
held that Virginia's miscegenation law was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.' Virginia argued that "because its
miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their
reliance on racial classifications do not constitute" 261 discrimination
based on race. The Court rejected "the notion that the 'mere equal
application' of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's
amounts to sex discrimination. 75 Haw. 530, 561-71 (1993). Suzzane Pharr, a feminist
scholar, argues that homophobia depends on and contributes to sexism. Suzanne Pharr,
HOMOPHOBIA - A WEAPON OF SEXISM 16-17 (1997). She observed "that heterosexism
and homophobia work together to enforce compulsory heterosexuality and that bastion of
patriarchal power, the nuclear family." Id Therefore, "to resist marriage and/or
heterosexuality," she continues, "is to risk severe punishment and loss." Id. at 17.
Indeed, resisting heterosexuality appears to lead to discrimination. Men who are
perceived to be feminine are called "queers," "faggots," or "perverts." Women who are
perceived be out of line with traditional femininity are called "dykes" or "lesbians." Gay
men are perceived to have broken ranks with male heterosexual solidarity and, therefore,
must be punished. See id. at 18. Lesbians, on the other hand, are perceived to have
moved out of sexual and economic dependence on men and, thus, are "a threat to the
nuclear family, to male dominance and control, to the very heart of sexism." Id. These
rigid gender roles serve to maintain male dominance and sexism. See id. As a result, laws
that discriminate against homosexuals are detrimental to all women.
256. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247,254 (1974).
257. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508,510 (Mo. 1986).
258. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,195-96 (1964).
259. See id.
260. See 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
261. Id. at 8.
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proscription of'262 [racial discrimination.]". The Court also noted that
"the fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classification must stand
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy., '263
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the question of
whether sexual orientation qualifies as a suspect or a quasi-suspect
class in Romer, it did not foreclose those options. Romer may even
be viewed as a launching pad for a future Court to apply intermediate
or strict scrutiny. Moreover, given its past precedents, the United
States Supreme Court may be forced to explain why sexual
orientation discrimination is not a form of sex discrimination.
Nevertheless, it is sufficient in this Note to observe that sexual
orientation discrimination is at least suspect-like.
c. Policy is Motivated by Animus or Prejudice
The Policy appears to punish honorable service members and
reward bigots. The fear behind the Policy is that some service
members would not be able to fulfill their duty professionally because
of their dislike of gays.2" As a result, mission accomplishment would
be jeopardized. The Policy, however, stresses that private attitudes
must be subordinated for the good of the unit.65 Yet rather than
disciplining service members who allow private bias to influence their
mission, the Policy seeks to punish service members who are the
victims of those private prejudices. In rewarding this insubordination,
the military risks mission accomplishment and unit cohesion by
bowing to the private prejudices of some service members. The
Policy, thus, is a manifestation of those private prejudices.
HI. Application of Heightened Rationality to the Policy
Romer and its predecessors indicate that the United States
Supreme Court rarely applies heightened rationality. When it does,
the Court disguises heightened rationality by using rational basis
language. The above discussion observes that certain factors push the
Court toward applying heightened rationality.2" It also illustrates that
262. Id.
263. Id. at 11.
264. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 954 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
265. Cf 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(5) (1999).
266. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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the Policy is a perfect candidate for heightened rationality review: its
classification is suspect-like, the rights affected are fundamental-like,
and it is based on animus.27
A. Unit Cohesion Is Not the True Motivation Behind the Policy and
thus is Not a Legitimate Government Interest
According to the Policy and many studies conducted by the
military, homosexual orientation does not affect a service member's
ability to fulfill his or her mission.268 Many outstanding gay, lesbian,
and bisexual soldiers have served and will continue to serve
honorably. 9 With respect to ability and skill, homosexuals and
heterosexuals are similarly situated.27  If individual mission
accomplishment is not a factor in distinguishing homosexual and
heterosexual service members, why does the government continue to
bar homosexuals from serving openly?
The government generally advances three interests: promotion of
unit cohesion, reduction of sexual tensions, and protection of
privacy." The government argues that homosexual conduct is
detrimental to unit cohesion.' It contends that excluding those who
commit homosexual conduct reduces sexual tension and promotes
privacy. 3 This Note contends that the latter two interests should be
subsumed under the first interest. Reduced sexual tension and more
privacy lead to a more cohesive unit. Thus, the government appears
to be primarily concerned that homosexual conduct would harm unit
cohesion.
At first glance, the government's interest in unit cohesion
appears to be legitimate. Unit cohesion is critical to the proper
functioning of the military. If a court were to use rational basis
review at this point, it would defer to the government's judgment and
stop probing, thus holding that unit cohesion is a legitimate interest.
On the other hand, heightened rationality allows a court to look more
closely at the government interest.
The government proffered the same interest during the military
267. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
268. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420,1436 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1997).
269. See generally, Randy Shilts, CONDUCr UNBECOMING (1994) (describing the
history of gay service members).
270. See generally, id
271. See, e.g., Philips, 106 F.3d at 1424.
272. See, e.g., id.
273. See, e.g., id.
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integration debate to keep black service members from serving side-
by-side with their white counterparts.74 The government feared that
integration would harm unit cohesion. 5  They explained that few
white soldiers would voluntarily sit, work, sleep, or eat next to black
soldiers.276 As a result, forced integration would lower "contentment,
teamwork, and discipline in the service." 27' Despite these apocalyptic
predictions, reason prevailed: President Truman integrated the
military through an executive order.278 Although unit cohesion might
have briefly been negatively affected at first, our service members
were able to successfully subordinate their private attitudes and
biases for the good of the unit. 79
Integration did not substantially affect unit cohesion. In fact, the
military today boasts of its ability to integrate different races within
its ranks more successfully than the civilian sector.m At the same
time, however, the military contends that it is unable to integrate
open homosexuals because its soldiers are incapable of following
orders to do so. This justification reflects, at best, unwillingness
rather than an inability to integrate open homosexuality.
Indeed, history shows that open homosexuality does not harm
unit cohesion. Whenever the military needs a homosexual service
member, it "loses" or delays his or her discharge."'  More
274. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915,952 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting).
Enlistment for general service implies that the individual may be sent anywhere,
- to any ship or station where he is needed. Men on board ship live in
particularly close association; in their messes, one man sits beside another; their
hammocks or bunks are close together; in their common tasks they work side by
side; and in particular tasks such as those of a gun's crew, they form a closely
knit, highly coordinated team. How many white men would choose, of their own
accord, that their closest associates in sleeping quarters, at mess, and in a gun's
crew should be of another race? How many would accept such conditions, if
required to do so, without resentment and just as a matter of course? The
General Board believes that the answer is "Few, if any," and further believes that
if the issue were forced, there would be a lowering of contentment, teamwork
and discipline in the service.
Id. at 952-953 (quoting the military committee that studied the possible integration of




278. See Phillips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1997).
279. See Karst, supra note 7, at 521.
280. See id.
281. See Shilts, supra note 269, at 6. The United States lags behind the world trend. In
forcing Britain to allow openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons to serve in its military,
the European Court of Human Rights has set a precedent. The United States's stance
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importantly, during times of war, when unit cohesion is most needed,
the military does not enforce its exclusionary policy.m Because the
military has the ability to order professional acceptance of open
homosexuals and has in the past allowed open homosexuals to serve,
its behavior suggests that unit cohesion is not truly the rationale
behind the Policy.
To the contrary, the Policy appears to harm unit cohesion. The
Policy promotes dishonesty among its ranks. It encourages gay
service members to remain silent or lie about their sexual orientation
as a condition of service. Even this deception would not guarantee
their place in the military as others may "tell" on them. As a result,
the Policy detrimentally affects the gay (but closeted) service
member's self-esteem and morale. It also diminishes the quality of
the gay service member's relationships with other service members,
with his or her superiors, and with the military institution, thus
harming unit cohesion.
Furthermore, in choosing to exclude homosexuals, the military
denigrates heterosexual service members.' It assumes that
heterosexual service members are bigots and homophobes. It
assumes that heterosexual service members lack the ability to follow
orders if commanded to accept homosexual service members on a
professional basis. These assumptions, however, are not only
historically flawed, but also detrimental to unit cohesion for they
suggest to heterosexual service members that they cannot be trusted
to keep their private bias under control. For the reasons above, this
Note concludes that unit cohesion is not truly the legitimate
government interest behind the Policy.
B. The Policy Is Under-inclusive and Over-inclusive
Even assuming, arguendo, that homosexual acts are disruptive
and divisive, the Policy is at once under-inclusive and over-inclusive.
It is under-inclusive because it does not regulate individuals who are
similarly situated. If the Policy truly regulates homosexual acts and
declarations of homosexuality because they destroy unit cohesion,
then heterosexuals who commit homosexual acts should be
may negatively affect United Nation global missions because foreign units with openly gay
troops would have to work side-by-side with American troops.
282. During the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars, the military curtailed its policy
excluding homosexuals. See Shilts, supra note 269 at 6.
283. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 951 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting)
(citing remarks of Dr. Lawrence J. Krob, Assistant Secretary of Defense under President
Reagan).
Winter 20011
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
discharged along with their gay counterparts. Heterosexuals who
state that they are homosexual should be removed as well as
homosexuals who openly declare their sexual orientation. If the
homosexual act alone is repulsive and divisive, why should it matter
who commits it? Likewise, if the declaration regarding homosexual
orientation is itself disruptive, then why should it matter who says it?
Yet, the Policy allows heterosexuals who commit homosexual
acts or state that they are homosexual to remain in the military.'
Homosexuals who commit the same acts or who declare their sexual
orientation, however, are removed from service.25 If the Policy really
targets homosexual acts and declarations because they are
detrimental to unit cohesion, then anyone who commits those acts
should be discharged. Because the Policy seeks to punish only
homosexuals, who are similarly situated with heterosexuals with
respect to committing those acts, it is under-inclusive.
The Policy is also under-inclusive because it (in theory) allows
open celibate homosexuals to serve.26 Again, if declarations of
homosexual orientation are disruptive, then celibate homosexuals
who assert their sexual orientation should be separated from the
service as well as those who are sexually active.
The Policy simultaneously is over-inclusive because it regulates
those who are not similarly situated. The military purports to apply
the Policy similarly throughout all branches and all military
occupation specialties ("MOS"). Each branch of service, however, is
different from others with respect to modes of operation.2' An Air
Force base has almost all the amenities offered in civilian life because
its mode of operation requires a stationary point of deployment. The
Navy, on the other hand, deploys and stations its troops on cramped
ships that may be out at sea for months. Therefore, unit cohesion
concerns may depend on the operation mode of each branch of the
Armed Forces.
Likewise, each MOS is different with regard to particular duties
performed and training required." A military doctor and a Judge
Advocate General (JAG) lawyer perform the same functions as their
284. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. The following descriptions of the different branches are greatly simplified for the
purpose of illustrating that some branches share the same mode of operation.
288. Again, the characteristics of the following examples are over-simplified to show
the differences in different MOS.
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civilian counterparts, except for a few weeks of military training.
Navy SEALS and Army Special Forces, on the other hand, train
rigorously in the fields. Hence, unit cohesion concerns may depend
on the type of duty performed and the training required.
An openly gay JAG lawyer stationed at an Air Force base is not
similarly situated to an openly gay green beret who is training in the
field. Because the latter could more likely implicate the Policy's
concerns than the former, an argument could be made that they
perhaps should not be treated the same. In treating them the same,
the Policy suffers from the problem of over-inclusiveness.
C. The Policy Is Ultimately Motivated By Animus
The unwillingness to allow openly gay individuals to serve in the
military is ultimately motivated by animus. At the outset, the
government is disingenuous when it argues that the Policy is conduct-
based and not status-based. Even assuming that the status/conduct
dichotomy exists, the language and history of the Policy undermine
the distinction. Buried under the "homosexual conduct" prohibition
is a ban on gay service members. In other words, the government
tries to mask discrimination based on homosexual status by arguing
that it is only prohibiting "homosexual conduct."
The government continues to be disingenuous when it argues
that unit cohesion concerns mandate the Policy. The government
maintains the Policy is necessary because heterosexual service
members are unwilling to serve side-by-side with open homosexual
service members. That argument is difficult to accept, particularly in
light of the government's boast that the military achieves racial
integration more completely and effectively than the civilian sector
due to its members' discipline and ability to follow orders
commanding them not to discriminate based on race. Yet when it
comes to homosexuality, the government laments that those same
soldiers suddenly are incapable of following orders not to
discriminate based on homosexual orientation.
Even assuming that open homosexuals disrupt unit cohesion, a
speculative assumption at best, the government cannot give effect to
express private prejudices. ' Yet, it is doing just that - catering to
service members' private prejudices - through the Policy. The
government uses the Policy to reinforce homophobia just as
289. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
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miscegenation laws were used to reinforce White Supremacy.2"
Conclusion
The Policy does not deserve military deference under Justice
Stevens's standard in Goldman. Under Justice Stevens's standard,
although courts would defer to the military expertise in the first
instance, courts require additionally that the classification be neutral
and completely objective. Even though courts would defer to the
military's judgment that the Policy promotes unit cohesion, Justice
Steven's standard requires that the Policy be neutral and completely
objective. Because the Policy is based on heterosexual service
members' prejudice toward openly gay service members, the Policy is
not completely objective and neutral. Therefore, the Policy should
not be afforded military deference and should be analyzed under
traditional equal protection analysis.
Under Romer and other heightened rationality cases, the Policy
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although the Supreme Court
has not explicitly endorsed heightened rationality, it has used it in
cases that involved (1) a suspect-like classification, (2) a fundamental-
like right, and (3) a law that is motivated by animus. The Policy is an
excellent candidate for heightened rationality because it falls into all
three categories. The Policy is suspect-like because it discriminates
against gays, lesbian, and bisexual service members and also may be a
form of sex discrimination. It is fundamental-like because it involves
the right to serve in the military and the right to marry. The Policy, at
bottom, is motivated by animus toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual
service members. Because unit cohesion is not the true government
interest behind the Policy; because the Policy is under-inclusive and
over-inclusive; and because the Policy is based on animus, the Policy
violates the Equal Protection Clause under heightened rationality
review.
290. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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